

**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

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**OPERATIONS ORDER 1-97
(OPERATION BOLD LEAP)**

BY

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT L. MCCLURE
United States Army**

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OPERATIONS ORDER 1-97

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LTC Robert L. McClure
The Center for Strategic and International Studies
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ABSTRACT

The United States military is facing increased political pressure to adjust itself to the emerging realities of a post-Cold War world while trying to recapitalize within flat defense budgets. Internationally, while dangers abound, serious threats to the homeland or our vital interests remain vague. Domestic priorities such as budget balancing and entitlement programs have not only eclipsed a needed national debate on defense, but made continued economic growth increasingly a matter of national security if, for no other reason, for the tough choices between defense and baby boomer pensions it permits us to avoid. Nowhere are all these pressures more evident than in the Army, the one service that has seen its operational mission load increase over 300% since 1989 while its budget has dropped 40% in real terms.

In this report LTC McClure argues in a novel format, an adapted operations order, that the Army should downsize more now, muster resources, and “skip” a generation to the weapons, equipment and organizations needed to confront America’s next near peer land power competitor beyond 2010.

Executive Summary:

“If I were King for a day, I would.....”

How many times have each of us muttered those exact words when faced with a problem that seems to defy a solution, especially one where the solution set we'd like to consider lies well beyond our present capabilities? It is a cry often used when we wish to do more than just solve the immediate problem at hand; we want to change part of the environment and do something truly different. We ache to think and act “out of the box”.

I contend that in many ways, the United States Army finds itself in just such a quandary as the 1990s draw to a close. Institutionally the Army is trying to balance competing demands of readiness and modernization while at the same time maintaining a force structure sufficient to meet the requirements of a national military strategy of being capable to conduct two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies (MRCs). Add in the increased demands of peacekeeping and other noncombat operations on an already reduced force structure, and those in uniform will say there's little wonder many units are near “the breaking point”.¹ Seemingly endless talk of salami slice cuts, and “doing more than less” because of declining defense budgets saps morale and distracts the entire force from focusing on its mission. Something has to give. There has to be a different way.

In trying to think through how to address all the many demands on the Army, it became useful to conceptualize solutions on a “clean sheet of paper”. Given that the primary reason for the Army's existence is to fight and win the nation's wars - so eloquently stated by former Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan, what would the

Army look like if I could wish away many of the impediments that keep me from taking a more optimal solution than just “doing more with less”?

Not all obstacles to change were ignored. The American people are not likely to reorient public spending solely toward creating the best Army in the world. Not only do they have that now, but ignoring all forces at work in our democracy instantly begs the credibility of any conclusions reached thereafter. A doomsday scenario featuring likely enemies with capabilities robust enough to be our twin was also not assumed in order to easily argue for a force that existed ten years ago at the height of the Cold War. The issue of roles and missions among the services, while perhaps needing to be updated from the Key West agreement of 1947 was also left largely untouched.² In other words, the Air Force was not folded back into the Army (however much many wish to see that happen). In this sense, while assuming to be King, I have studiously tried not to adopt Godlike powers.

Like many others throughout the Army trying look at the future, I projected forward to about the year 2010; just beyond our collective ability to comfortably reach today - also the projected reappearance date of our next “near peer threat”³, and tried to envision both our national interests and the Army needed to defend those interests. To me, it is the blindingly obvious combination of today’s international and domestic situation affecting the American Defense and the Army that compels action now to be ready for that next peer in 2010 and beyond. In order to meet the next challenge in 10-15 years - at a time of strategic pause and at best flat defense budgets - the Army must “skip” a generation ahead in organization, doctrine and weaponry. In doing so it will also

probably have to change its culture as much or more than in the past; something as unavoidable as it might be necessary. As King, in order to make changes necessary in the Army by that date, I assumed power not found in any one office; neither the Chief of Staff, the Joint Chiefs Chairman, nor any Commander in Chief. Indeed, particularly with regard to the reserve components several laws may have to be changed, thereby involving Congress. To help order my thinking as King, I next needed a plan, an operations order to guide execution.

Critics of the attached modified operations order will quickly say that while the situation paragraph may be a fair description of the problem, paragraph 3 is woefully inadequate to guide a multi-year execution effort. In response, I am reminded of General George Patton's adage about telling soldiers what, *not how*, to do something and they'll amaze you with their ingenuity. Paragraph 4 has also been somewhat truncated and a conclusion substitutes for command and signal in paragraph 5.

Those specific items mentioned for change herein are not meant to be all inclusive nor exclusive of what needs change. There are doubtless hundreds of bureaucracies and regulations I have overlooked. However their mention here does indicate at least my judgment as to their relative importance in reaching the objective. By itself this operations order will probably not accomplish near as much as I hope. But if it does help foster creative "out of the box" thinking and a passion to *want* change, to seize and mold the future to our advantage, it will have achieved its purpose.

"The enemy of our time is inaction."⁴

Operations Order 1-97 (Operation Bold Leap)

I. Situation:

A. International Context:

To simply state that the changes in the international arena brought about by the collapse of Communism in 1989 were monumental is to still underestimate its significance in a world grown weary of superlative adjectives. Almost overnight the relative power among the great nations of the world shifted as in few times since the creation of the modern nation state following the treaty of Westphalia in 1648. After 40 years of bipolar Cold War between superpowers, the United States emerged as the world's preeminent military and economic power, particularly after its performance in the Gulf War at the turn of this decade.

Projecting ahead to the year 2010, the international landscape is one in which, despite protestations to the contrary⁵, the nation state will still be the preeminent actor using international power toward specific ends. And the United States, still the world's most powerful nation state in the year 2010, will continue to have interests in the world, some of which will be vital, toward which it is prepared to commit military forces. While many have tried to define what those interests are, general agreement among policy makers exists in two or three broad areas. In addition to protecting the homeland and sustaining the growth of the U.S. economy, named vital interests include preventing the domination of east Asia and Europe by an adversarial power. A secondary, but still very important, interest will be to maintain stability in the Persian Gulf, thereby insuring unimpeded access for the world to oil and gas resources.⁶ Although drug lords and crime

cartels will continue to cause problems for civilized nations, the dispute over land - the medium upon which man lives - will dominate security planning of nations well past the year 2010. In short, land and resources will still count. The unmistakable point here is that the United States, as the world's sole superpower for as long as anyone is willing to reliably predict, will be the only nation with vital interests throughout the world and not confined to one geographic region as may be the case with all other major world powers.

The first question then is, who will we fight in these regions? In Europe, it is hard even for diehard Cold Warriors to imagine a resurgent Russia threatening its neighbors to the west. Presently no more than 20 per cent of its military manpower perform combat related jobs, only eight maneuver divisions are judged mission capable (and four of those are under a peacekeeping command), air assault forces will have only 10 per cent of their required lift by the year 2000, and Russian air forces' actual flying time is less than 30 per cent of that scheduled due to fuel shortages. Even more fundamental issues of nonpayment of wages, increasing suicides and desertions indicate the Russian military may be more of a threat to its nascent democracy than anyone else.⁷ While the proliferation or loss of control of Russian nuclear weapons remains a concern for the United States, this issue is unlikely to affect the gross disparity in conventional land power between our two nations for at least a decade.

On the Pacific rim the question of how peacefully China will integrate into the circle of great powers over the next decade remains unanswered and conventional wisdom holds that it will be the next "near peer" competitor that could threaten our vital interests. Although possessing a sizable nuclear weapons arsenal, China's conventional

forces are still, "probably two decades away from challenging or holding its own against a modern military force".⁸ Thus far, and despite disputes over proliferation, trade and human rights issues, neither China nor the United States has shown any inclination of allowing their relationship to deteriorate toward military conflict. Management of this relationship - with economics certainly influencing policy here more than in other regions - will occupy a justified "first order" ranking for both nations out to the year 2010 and beyond. However, from a purely conventional force point of view, it is hard to envision the United States directly engaging China with land forces for at least a decade, if not longer.

Well before that date, some predict even within weeks of this writing, the peninsula of Korea will reunify with the only question being whether it will be peaceful or result in one final conflict. Once this issue has been resolved, the prospects of large land warfare on the rimland of Asia will likely decrease for an extended period. While not discounting the competing economic interests of the major powers in the region, China, Japan and the "tigers" of south Asia, there is presently no compelling reason to assume they will opt for armed conflict over mutual economic accommodation. In short, the United States will continue to play a power balancing role in the region, clearly welcomed by all, and the extent to which it chooses to remain engaged will insure regional confidence and likely forestall conflict at least past 2010, and hopefully longer.

Even in the Persian Gulf region things have changed. The United Nations' embargo on Iraq has thwarted Saddam Hussein's attempts to rearm his military, although international solidarity will still be needed for some time in order to forestall his desire

for weapons of mass destruction and insure Iraq will not again threaten its neighbors. Iran's military, still recovering from its war with Iraq has, interestingly, dramatically cut its international arms purchases in order to bolster a weak economy.⁹ That is not to say Iran has decided to abandon its decades old desire for regional dominance. Indeed, Iran's selective purchases of cruise missiles, submarines and medium range rockets in recent years clearly indicate it might have designs on trying to close, or severely restrict, the Strait of Hormuz, thereby choking international oil shipments.¹⁰ It is exactly this asymmetrical approach to security planning by Iran, with its emphasis on longer range missiles and terrorism, that most concerns American planners in this region today. Still, absent another bold land grab in the region similar to Hussein's in 1990, American responses to threats like Iran in the Gulf region will probably center around firepower instead of massed armies. The recent case study for this type response was our unilateral cruise missile attack against Hussein's armored forces in the fall of 1996. This is not to say the Army will be irrelevant to enforcing American policy in the region, but absent naked aggression by another army, it will probably not be the first instrument of political choice.

If those are the strategic regions that will matter in the year 2010, what will we fight about? With Communism discredited and the Soviet Union dismantled, ideology will not be nearly the major factor in nation state conflict it was during the Cold War. Samuel Huntington's thesis about a "clash of civilizations", as opposed to the economic ideology clash that dominated the Cold War, has been offered and with it he compellingly explains the ongoing tension between the western, Islamic and Sino worlds. While

perhaps too early to know if he is correct, and there are many naysayers¹¹, the problem of what to do about national defense if he were correct would probably distract us even more. The overarching policy of containment against an ideology and enemy who could, and often avowed, to destroy us, helped rally public support for large defense expenditures for more than 40 years. Making the same case today in the American populace would be much harder.

Many others will point to the problems of nations in transition as the breeding ground of future interstate conflict. In this regard, events in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia are used as prime examples of the ethnic and environmental issues that will preoccupy us in the new millennia. In other words, the future to them looks a lot like the past several years; a period in which we've experienced a 300% increase in American military operations since 1989. For the Army this argument has particular meaning as in the five year period 1991-1995 more peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and humanitarian assistance operations were initiated, lasted a longer period of time, and involved larger forces than during any previous five year period since 1975.¹² This increase is no more dramatically portrayed than in comparing the data for Army deployments to the five years before and after the Gulf War.

FREQUENCY:

1986-1990: 15 Incidents

1990-1995: 41 Incidents

SIZE:

1986-1990: 14 Medium to Large Deployments

1990-1995: 25 Medium to Large Deployments

DURATION:

1986-1990: 0 Incidents Lasted Longer Than 1 Year

1990-1995: 13 Incidents Lasted Longer Than 1 Year

Table 1¹³

However, to be fair, almost all of these operations were not great state conflicts and, despite occasional rhetoric to the contrary, the majority also did not involve vital American interests. Indeed, there is ample evidence to suggest that American political will to become involved in future humanitarian disaster and peacekeeping operations has peaked. For example, due to significant Congressional pressure American involvement in Bosnia is now slated to end in July, 1998 and our pullout does not hinge on the warring parties continuing the current cease fire. After our experience in Somalia, American leaders were loath to commit ground forces in Rwanda and Zaire; situations where human suffering was at least, if not more, dire. While agreeing that international crises like stemming the flow of economic refugees onto Florida's shores, and limiting ethnic slaughter in Bosnia are very much in American interests for reasons that have to do more with our moral leadership in the world than anything else, they do not rival what was at stake both in the Cold War ideologically, and in the Gulf War economically. These "lesser regional contingencies", and other threats to general good order in the world, including terrorism, will occupy space in the media but cannot, nor should not, be construed to threaten survival of the American homeland or our vital interests in the world. These contingencies should not be the organizing principle around which our Army is organized.

What will surely spur the American people into action is any international incident causing a sudden shock to the economy such that it creates massive domestic destabilization. While not digressing into a detailed analysis into the interdependence of international trade and the domestic economy, I only pause to point out the growth of

international trade regimes, such as NAFTA, the World Trade Organization and the European Community within the last two decades as evidence of the growing importance of interdependent, international trade to the American economy. Domestic economic stability and growth will become increasingly a matter of national security concern the more economically interdependent all nations, particularly the first tier, of the world become. This can further inferred by Europe and the Pacific rim being specifically identified by the Army After Next and the President's National Security Advisor as being of vital interest. (see note 6 above) In short, great nation conflict in the first part of the next century will most likely stem from reasons of economic security more than anything else. Or, to borrow a phrase from the 1992 presidential campaign, "it's the economy, stupid."

To summarize, as one looks out fifteen years to the world in 2012, the prospects for conflict will be very different than they were in 1982. Rather than determining national interests through the lens of an overarching "containment" policy that characterized the Cold War, American vital interests in the years ahead will derive more from the real economic necessity of ensuring access to both markets and resources in the named market regions; Europe and the far east, as well as secondary access to petroleum resources in the Persian Gulf. And in prosecuting policies to secure these national interests, land power will still play a pivotal, if not the central, role. Despite impressive technological advancements in weaponry and reconnaissance, and the ongoing "revolution in military affairs" debate, significant land power will still be needed to hold at risk those things valued by adversaries and demonstrate America's commitment to its

allies. While seemingly obvious, it still needs to be stated clearly that as long as nations exist and conduct their business on the ground, as opposed to the air or sea, credible land power will be essential to survival. What is significantly different past 2010 will be the distances and environments to which the United States will have to project land power, as opposed to the way it has done so since 1945.

The conundrum comes in that, primarily because the Cold War has ended, nations around the world have trimmed defense spending such that the threat to U.S. vital interests can be said to have measurably decreased since 1989. One expert contends that the United States and its major allies (NATO, Japan, South Korea and Israel - countries that nobody expects we will face militarily) already account for 80 per cent of the world's military expenditures.¹⁴ European NATO nations have cut defense budgets several years in a row and the drive for a single currency within the European Community is beginning to impact their domestic budget agendas.¹⁵ Russia's military spending, while difficult to reliably track, has dramatically decreased according to a wide range of independent agencies.¹⁶ Simply put, although the United States has decreased defense spending over the past few years, we're still far outspending any potential adversary and nobody is trying to catch up.

No, peace has not broken out all over, forever. It is still a dangerous world, but in comparison to fifteen years ago, it is far less lethal - particularly to named American vital interests. In sum, “[t]he world is in the midst of an extended post-Cold War transition that will last at least another decade,”¹⁷ and the next 15 years will likely be recalled at this point in the next century as one of relative international stability and strategic pause for

America, not unlike that for us at the beginning of the 20th century. However, rather than thinking it is 1895 again, we in the Army need to understand that the present international and technological similarities are most apropos to the interwar period of 1925-1930, and accordingly change the Army now rather than in the face of impending war as General Marshall did in 1939.

B. Domestic context:

For the third time this decade, and this time at the behest of a 100-0 vote in the Senate, a thorough analysis of U.S. defense strategy, force structure and spending is underway. Called the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), this effort is charged with trying to assess what America's defense requirements will be past the year 2005. And, although the Bush administration's Base Force assessment and the Clinton Administration's "Bottom-Up-Review" were important force shaping documents, Congressional frustration with the pace of change in the Pentagon since the end of the Cold War was almost palpable in its legislation language.

Both assessments [the Bush and Clinton reviews] served an important purpose in focusing attention on the need to reevaluate the military posture of the United States, but the pace of global change necessitates a new, comprehensive assessment of the defense strategy of the United States and the force structure of the Armed Forces required to meet the threats to the United States in the twenty-first century.¹⁸

At the same time, a growing consensus has emerged throughout Washington that defense budgets do not match strategy and neither match the forces, present or planned. Estimates range from a \$20 Billion annual shortfall in modernization funds, to many times that by others.¹⁹ But to concentrate the debate just on modernization accounts, on whether the nation can afford all the Seawolf submarines, F-22s and JSF fighters

currently in the plan - along with a ten division Army - is to attack the problem at the wrong end. The defense budget's real problems stem from a dramatic decrease in defense budget share of the Gross Domestic Product because the Cold War is over, a need to recapitalize the force across the board to replace systems purchased during the Reagan buildup, and a lack of political room to maneuver with resources to fix the problem because of domestic pressures to balance the budget and maintain entitlement programs ad infinitum.

The traditional cost of American leadership in the world since 1945 has been two to three times that which we are spending today. Throughout the Cold War, the United States averaged spending well over 5 % of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on National Defense, *even during the period after Vietnam*. Comparative "high point" years from 1950 to the present for defense spending as a share of GDP were 1953, 11.9% and 1968, 9.1%.²⁰ Indeed, as late as 1988 defense spending was 6% of GDP. The projected FY 97 defense authorization is slightly more than 3% of GDP and is projected to level off at around 2.7% after the turn of the century. As a percentage of federal outlays, DoD's slice has been cut by more than half, 38.8% to 17.1%, in the 20 years from 1965 to 1995.²¹ In laymen's terms, this means that less than three per cent of everything produced in America is given over to national defense, and less than 20 cents of every dollar we tax ourselves goes toward that end. No damning judgments should be drawn from such figures because to do so would seemingly also indict the system that produced it. Absent a major threat or war, numbers like this will be reality and the American

public seems willing to accept the consequences thus far, and will likely do so through the first decade of the next century.

What compounds this drop in defense spending, caused by the end of the Cold War, is that an entire generation of major weapons platforms across all the services - purchased during the Reagan buildup in the early 1980s - will reach the end of their serviceable lives in the first half of the next decade. Figure 2 shows the relative age in years for major weapons platforms across the four services out to the year 2002.

Average Age (Years)	FY 90	FY 97	FY 02
Navy/Marine Fighter Attack Force	10	10	13
Army Armored Vehicles	7	10	12
Air Force Fighter Attack Force	11	11	16
Naval Surface Combatants - Active	15	12	14

Figure 2²²

The current fight over service modernization dollars complicates age projections for the force in 2010 but even the most optimistic predictions are sobering because of the wholesale block obsolescence that extends across the entire force. Although each service wants to field replacement systems, inflation - on top of the disappeared threat - is causing major fielding problems. The Army's armored gun system replacement for the M-1 tank was canceled last year, in part, for this reason. These same pressures are at

work now as the Air Force and Navy battle over the affordability of future jet fighters.²³ And, while everyone understands that new weapons cost money, the surprise comes in finding out how much and why. One expert contends that, since World War II, new weapons costs have increased about 7 per cent a year, operations and maintenance between 2 and 4 per cent, and personnel at about 3 per cent.²⁴ By comparison, the annual consumer price index has averaged below 4% for the last 10 years and not topped 7% since 1982. In other words, the cost of maintaining defense and replacing weapons has far outpaced general economic inflation in society. Even if the defense budget stays "flat" at around \$250 billion, indexed for domestic inflation, it will continue to lose purchasing power.

Compounding the funding shortfall even more is the amount of time required to effect change in the force. For reasons as much political (for base closures) as programmatic (for major systems), major change just does not happen fast in the military-industrial complex. Figure 3 is a list of notional timelines to either field a major weapon system or make other changes in the force. The arithmetic of achieving resource savings through any combination of actions should be obvious.

Fielding of New Weapon System From Start of:

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| - Advanced Technology Demonstration | 8 to 10 years |
| - Engineering and Manufacture Development | 5 to 7 years |
| - Production | 3 to 7 years |

Manpower Acquisition (Recruit to Unit Assignment)

- | | |
|------------------|--------------|
| - Junior Officer | 5 to 6 years |
| - Enlisted | 1 to 2 years |

Base Closures (Identification to Closure)

Force Reductions

Manpower Reductions

2 to 7 years
2 to 4 years
< 1 year

Figure 3²⁵

What these figures indicate is that change takes time, and the time to affect the force desired in the year 2010 is fast running out. Even if radical changes are recommended this year as part of the QDR, much of their effect on the force won't impact until after 2003. The only real "fast" money comes from force reductions while that saved through base closures and/or other defense wide efficiencies is illusory and usually much slower than predicted.²⁶

As if all that were not enough, the American public voted resoundingly in 1994, and again in 1996, for a balanced federal budget. After much partisan political hemming and hawing, government projections now estimate the budget will actually have a small surplus in the year 2002. Given the political effort involved in reaching that milestone, absent emergence of a significant threat to national security or vital interests over the next decade, there is certain to be little domestic political support for either raising taxes or renewing deficits to pay for recapitalizing the force. Further complicating the issue even more is the rise in mandatory spending in the federal budget. To illustrate, for the period FY 90- FY 02, real change in defense outlays is expected to decrease 33% while mandatory spending will increase over 45%.²⁷ Within these two numbers lies the essence of our national debate about mandatory spending on entitlement programs, and discretionary spending which includes defense. This issue will only intensify when one considers the impact of the Medicare A and Social Security on future overall federal and defense spending. According to the Systems Planning Corporation, analyzing data provided by the Social Security and Medicare intermediate forecasts, Medicare A and

Social Security trust funds are depleted in FY 2001 and FY 2030 respectively.²⁸ As these dates approach, the political pressure from aging baby boomers to insure their entitlements do not erode will likely only increase from an already significant level today. The effect of these domestic trend lines is that economic growth has now, de facto, become certainly a matter of national debate and concern, if not also national security, because unless fundamental changes are made, it keeps us as a nation from having to choose between funding pensions or national defense .

In short, the frustration of Pentagon planners centers around what to do about a modernization account, already underfunded to help balance the budget, that has been robbed to pay for downsizing and current operations. Anyone in the force can readily attest that the pace of operations in the 1990s is far higher than anyone thought it would be a few years ago. Stories of Air Force and Army personnel being deployed for up to half a year or more are not uncommon. Knowing the defense share of federal spending is not likely to rise soon,²⁹ the military has been forced to postpone modernization indefinitely to pay for increased worldwide operations.

The frustration of Congress stems, in part, from a belief that Pentagon planners have failed to fully recognize the changed geostrategic landscape since 1989 and manifests itself in demanding the current comprehensive review of strategy and resources. This is not just because Congress wants to reallocate spending for domestic programs, but because it is also concerned that holdover Cold War thinking, planning and procurement will continue without question - as evidenced in the QDR legislation language cited above. This concern may have some merit as for the past 50 years the

organizing principle of the American military was the Cold War and in particular, the threat of another major land war in Europe. Everything in the force from large deck carriers to penetrating bombers and attack aircraft to 70 ton tanks and Pershing missiles were fielded to forestall a massive Soviet attack on the industrial heartland of western Europe. Many of these weapon systems remain in the Pentagon's current procurement plan with the most obvious examples being the Air Force F-22 fighter and the Army's Crusader artillery system. Both were designed for, and would have excelled on, the battlefields of Europe against the Warsaw Pact. Their value added to the force required in 2010, one that will need to be strategically agile from a CONUS base, is questionable for the price at this time.³⁰

C. Summary and Impact for the Army:

What all this means for the Army, as a subset of the entire defense establishment, is simple. Domestically, there will be enormous pressure to limit discretionary federal spending both to balance the budget and to postpone painful political decisions on entitlement programs. A period of relative international tranquillity means the chances of large scale land conflict will be reduced. While there will surely continue to be problems with "troubled states" that require the Army's attention from time to time, such conflict with other nations as America is likely to involve itself in for the next several years will probably be resolved through the use of applied firepower as opposed to massed land power. However, LAND POWER HAS NOT BECOME OBSOLETE!! While massed land power was appropriate for 40 years when fighting a numerically superior enemy in a fully mature theater, a doctrine of applying remote

firepower to secure vital interests forever is tantamount to adopting a national “Maginot Line” mindset. What will fundamentally change for the application of land power in the future is that it will increasingly be used in remote theaters with little, if any, infrastructure. Indeed, what should haunt the Army for much of the next ten years is not how it would fight in Korea or manage ethnic conflict in the Balkans, but how it would project power into austere regions such as northern Iran or other places on the periphery of the Asian mainland where there is little support structure. Future scenarios that demand the Army - not the Marines - project power to either seal an expanded NATO from a disintegrated Russia, or hold at risk a geographic region valued by China in order to insure a balance of power are not too far fetched.

It is during this period of transition, estimated to be about a decade, that a wholesale transformation of the Army should take place from one anchored in Cold War organizations and thought, to one that utilizes all the technologies available in, and is ready for, the 21st century. While the duration of this generally peaceful period may hopefully be extended, and here former Defense Secretary Perry’s emphasis on crisis prevention will be key in that effort, there is no evidence to say that war, particularly large wars, have become obsolete state behavior. When the next land war comes, as surely it will, the U.S. Army will want to be as overwhelming in effect as that which won the 1991 Gulf War in 100 hours of ground combat. Indeed it will need to be that for the United States to remain as dominant a world power as it is today.

II. Mission: As a result of international and domestic changes brought on by the end of the Cold War, starting with FY 00 the Army will begin a sustained 10 year transformation process to recast itself organizationally and doctrinally to take full advantage of emerging technologies in its fielding of weapons systems so that it can maintain clear dominance over potential adversaries and remain the world's preeminent land power well into the 21st century.

III. Execution

A. Commander's Intent:

The two constants that must remain fixed in every soldier's mind are that the Army exists to fight and win the nation's wars, and the American way of winning war is to win "on our terms" with overwhelming force.³¹ However, in the next ten to fifteen years, the likelihood of the United States having to use overwhelming large land forces is small, and particularly small in the near term of five years. Our relative advantage over potential adversaries, in all services but particularly the Army, is simply too big to invite a symmetrical response to our strength.

The vision of the Army in the year 2010 is one that will have a brigade sized element do essentially what a division can today (and a division sized element possessing a Corps' capabilities) in terms of territory controlled, firepower delivered and, importantly, logistics required. It will be a force designed and prepared to deploy from the United States into an immature theater, "execute violently" to accomplish its mission and set the preconditions for further political developments. What the future Army will

NOT be is just a larger Marine Corps. The Marines rightly advertise themselves as winning the nation's battles. As stated above, the Army wins wars and is a testament to the nation's resolve in any endeavor it is committed for it represents the country's soul. But the two land-centric services should work in concert, particularly during the upcoming transition period with "troubled states" as part of managing the international environment to prolong the strategic pause. Indeed, because battles vice wars are expected in the short term, increased use of Marines for operations other than war can mitigate the risk associated with changing the Army as needed. Given the expected resource constraints highlighted above, and because of the tremendous change required throughout the culture of the Army to shed forever mindsets forged over 40 years of infrastructure rich possible battlefields, the Army will need to take significant short term personnel end strength cuts. Not only will this free needed modernization funds at a time when massed manpower will likely not be needed, but a smaller force will be easier to fundamentally change in the manner required for post 2010 combat.

With that in mind, the Army will intentionally sacrifice active duty end strength in the near term (FY 00-03) in order to concentrate on developing the advanced technologies required to recapitalize the force by FY 10. In relative terms, these cuts will seem significant for they will need to be large enough to generate sufficient resources as well as cause enough "intentional pain" in the culture to break Cold War habits. Although much analytic work still needs to be done, cutting today's advertised 495,000 force by at least another 25% should begin to accomplish both objectives. Beginning at that same time, but gaining momentum during the following four years (FY 04-07), the Army will

restructure its organizations and rewrite its doctrine to fully reflect and employ these capabilities in the decades beyond 2010. These two efforts will be melded together during the period FY 08-10, with soldiers now the product of a revamped recruiting and schooling process that began fundamental change in FY 02, throughout the Army to again make it the preeminent land combat power on earth.

During this period of strategic pause and force reconstitution, Army Reserve, National Guard, other service forces, such as the Marines, and allies will be increasingly used vice the active forces wherever possible, in peacekeeping, humanitarian and similar “operations other than war” (OOTW) that have thus far characterized the post Cold War era. Infrastructure throughout the force in terms of bases, but particularly logistics, will be trimmed dramatically. Finally, the relationship between the reserve components and active duty forces will, again starting with FY 00, begin to evolve so that by the year 2020 the National Guard will be the primary repository of combat support and combat service support forces, with the Army Reserve having back up land combat and combat support capabilities for the active force.

I define success as an Army in the year 2010 that possesses the same relative advantages over potential adversaries across the spectrum of conflict as it does today, an Army that is the envy of the world and one that continues to set the example for other democratic nations to emulate.

B. Concept of the Operation:

In terms of active forces, the concept will be to keep the major overseas stationed forces, in Europe and the far east, at roughly the same strength they are today,

in their same general organizations (divisions), through at least FY 07. After that time they will begin transition to the future force structure and maintain overseas presence in accordance with treaty obligations and diplomatic necessity. Force structure and personnel reductions required to free up resources in the short term will occur in the CONUS force, and particularly the heavy divisions, along with concomitant base closures to reduce infrastructure overhead. Again, with a significantly decreased chance of America fighting a large land war in the next five to ten years, there is little need to maintain these relics of our Cold War standoff with the Soviet Union. While many will lament the mountains of fairly new M-1 Abrams tanks and M-2 Bradley fighting vehicles being retired, rather than using today's force for offshore artificial reefs, a large percentage could be kept in storage just in case they were needed. A precedent for this is the manner in which the United States kept readied equipment propositioned in Europe during the Cold War.

To further mitigate risk, one heavy division and one Armored Cavalry Regiment will complete transition to "Force XXI" configuration, stay as the only units with this capability, and be retained as the Army's "silver bullet" through FY 10 for contingencies while the remainder of the force reconstitutes. The remainder of the active force will begin reorganization toward a combined arms brigade concept, with one division serving as the initial test bed from FY 02-04. Reorganization of all other CONUS forces will be complete by FY 07, with the remaining overseas forces by FY 10.³²

Understanding that future technologies and organizations will require a more mature, sophisticated and intelligent soldier than normally found in today's units, starting

in FY 00 the Army will begin experimenting with a combination of much longer enlistments, earlier vesting, and skill schooling so that those serving in the 2010 Army will have the requisite mid and senior level leaders needed to use the new Army's capabilities. One of the emerging impressions from the Army After Next program is a realization that human behavior remains the most important factor in warfare - even in the information age. The responsibility and judgment pushed down the chain of command in the year 2010 will be factors more than that today. Training soldiers and leaders to excel in this environment will be key to realizing all the new century's potential. This "retuning" of how the Army develops leaders will continue throughout the decade so that all soldiers possess similar value structures, are comfortable with ambiguity and change, and encourage prudent risk taking in subordinates.

This operation to the year 2010 will be conducted in three phases that are interlocked throughout, with a supporting effort from the reserve components and other services for assistance with expected OOTW as the force transitions.

Phase I (FY 00-03): It is no secret in Army circles, and particularly to those who have served in the field, that the Army's funding for research, development and fielding of new equipment is woefully inadequate. "With only \$10.6 billion for procurement and RDT&E combined, the lowest in real terms since FY 1959, it is simply not adequate to meet future requirements and ensure the Army remains technologically superior."³³

Assuming the Army's share of defense will not climb from its current 24% - a safe bet, the only place significant resources can be made available soon for modernization is through force cuts. Critics will cite the unprecedented pace of ongoing operations as

reason NOT to cut active duty forces.³⁴ However, the Army has learned to use reserve component forces for peacekeeping and other operations with no degradation in effect. Indeed, "top US military leaders in Europe agree unanimously they are satisfied with the quality and performance of reserve units and would like to put them to greater use."³⁵ Reserve forces have already rotated to the Multinational Force Observer mission in the Sinai and are planned for use next year in Macedonia. Properly resourced and planned, reserve components can do more in this arena and will "do as much as they can handle"³⁶ in the period FY 00-03 and beyond accomplishing missions that, while important to the nation, are not as critical to its survival or directly affect a vital national interest. Resources saved from active force downsizing will be dedicated to technologies and force modernization beyond the current Force XXI.

In addition to internally creating resources to buy new equipment, the Army will begin to reorganize its ground combat elements around a strike force, or brigade based concept. Many models for this have already been proposed. Most notable and provocative is that of COL Doug Macgregor in his book, Breaking the Phalanx³⁷, but the brigade based concept has also been used extensively in every Army After Next concepts workshop. The Defense Science Board's summer study for 1996 highlighted the possibilities of empowering small, dispersed units with advanced technologies to produce effects "now requiring much larger and heavier forces".³⁸ Much thought and work has already been done, we're 80% of the way there. During the period FY 00-03 all these organizational proposals will be studied and tested further and ready for implementation during phase II.

The introduction of Airland Battle doctrine was a signal event in recent Army history. First introduced at the end of the Vietnam War, but gaining full momentum during the Reagan buildup after 1980, it was the catalyst that helped drive force structure and weapons procurement, as well as teach officers how to think creatively about their profession. Gone forever were terms like “active defense” that were little more than thin veils for attrition warfare. With Airland Battle doctrine, today’s generation of officers learned about areas of influence and interest, as well as how to “get inside the enemy’s decision cycle”. It was a fun doctrine because it encouraged creativity throughout the force.³⁹ However, it was also designed to ensure the maximum effect of an advanced industrial age army could be brought to bear against a numerically superior force; the Soviets in Europe. We need a new doctrine to reflect the fact our Army’s transition beyond the industrial and into the information age.⁴⁰

One early suggestion is based upon the notion of achieving “rapid dominance” over an adversary through application of “Shock and Awe”.⁴¹ While still embryonic, this idea does at least recognize the distinct American comparative advantage over all other nations; that of information processing, both electronically and within a military command structure. It is a start, not the answer. During the period FY 00-03 the Army will create the information age equivalent doctrine to the 1980s Airland Battle.

Phase I will end with a division and Armored Cavalry Regiment fully fielded with Force XXI equipment to be used as a “silver bullet” if necessary, the Army having rewritten its doctrine to take advantage of the emerging information age and a brigade based expeditionary force structure fully tested and ready for implementation with

emerging technologies. "Be all you can be" will be retired by FY 00 in favor of a more applicable slogan that will attract the soldier needed to operate comfortably in the technologically advanced world of 2010. Recruiting, schooling and retention policies will have been changed and fully in place by FY 03 so the Army, but particularly its soldiers, will be able to better utilize the potentials of the planned transformation.

Phase II (FY 04--07): During phase II the emphasis will shift away from finding resources for modernization toward final refinement and implementation of the organizational structures needed to fully implement the Army of 2010. The necessary information age doctrine would have been completed by this date and begun to influence weapons procurement as well as education and unit training. In keeping with a century long trend (see Appendix A), this doctrine will emphasize joint operations at almost every level of command. Phase II will end with reorganization of CONUS forces to the new brigade based concept, fielding of advanced weapons and equipment, and further integration of, now more senior, soldiers and leaders that are the product of a revamped recruiting and education system.

Phase III (FY 08-10): This phase will complete the Army's reconstitution by reorganizing, perhaps by rotation with those in CONUS, all overseas stationed forces. Recapitalized equipment and weapons will be fielded throughout the remainder of the force with the exception of the Force XXI units. They will continue in their Force XXI configuration until 2010, when they will reconstitute to become the Army's next test bed of equipment and organizations for the year 2020 and beyond.

One of the major reasons for using National Guard forces during phase I for OOTW is their irrelevance to the current military strategy, and a likely continuation of that trend in the new century.⁴² The United States has not activated a National Guard combat division since World War II, and the anticipated need to do so after 2010 will decrease even further after the active force reconstitutes into a more potent instrument of national power. Although the Army willingly embraced the “Total Army Concept” after Vietnam to try and insure the American people were committed when active forces were sent to war, it is time to change the policy again. While the National Guard, almost since the Republic’s birth, has continued to demonstrate its worth to the nation in time of domestic disturbance or disaster, its recent 50 year record during international conflict is not as compelling. During this period of strategic pause an evolution of roles will begin to take place such that reserve component combat forces, divisions or forces under the new battle group/brigade concept, will begin to reside in the Army Reserve. Combat service support forces needed for longer term sustainment of the force will migrate to the National Guard who, in times of peace, will be more useable and effective in this configuration for domestic use by the states. This evolution of roles by the Guard and Reserve will be complete by the year 2020.

IV. Service Support:

Criticisms of the “tooth to tail” ratio in the Army, and throughout the Department of Defense, have been raised for years, but have taken on particular veracity in the post Cold War era. If “teeth” in Defense spending is defined by the resources allocated to all

strategic and general purpose forces, including air and sealift, and "tail" is all other accounts, then the ratio is badly skewed by a factor of 2 to 1 toward infrastructure. Indeed, the last time "teeth" was higher than "tail" by this definition was 1985, before that 1965.⁴³ The Defense Science Board, in its 1996 Summer Study, estimated that 55% of DoD's budget was given over to infrastructure and support and that, if its recommendations were vigorously implemented, up to \$30 billion in savings could be achieved through a combination of vigorous outsourcing, base closures and logistics management improvements.⁴⁴

The Army is not the worst in this regard, nor is it the best. But it ought to lead the way in infrastructure consolidation. Beginning in FY 00 the reserve components will begin administration of CONUS active duty installations. That is, they will serve as garrison commanders and throughout the support staff, whose functions have not been already outsourced to private industry. Outsourcing will take on renewed emphasis throughout the Army with the goal of cutting infrastructure costs by 50% by FY 05. An aggressive study of combat service support functions, and branches, will commence in FY 00 and recommend by FY 03 which branches can be eliminated and/or merged.

Agreed, this issue is extremely complicated and politically charged, but to not try and address it, even with extreme measures, is to continue to suffer the consequences of a moribund Cold War infrastructure.

V. Conclusion:

We are at a period of strategic pause in America, a period between the disappearance of the last major threat to our survival in 1989, and the probable emergence of a peer competitor to our vital interests a decade hence. At the same time, an emerging national consensus sees no reason to continue funding defense at Cold War levels. This alone should be enough impetus to reevaluate how we approach defense and Army planning for the future. Add in the dawning of the information age as we enter the new millennia, and the issue becomes even more prescient. As such, “business as usual” in the Army cannot be the way business should be conducted in the future.

Revolution from within, vice evolution throughout, is how the Army needs to approach this period of pause before it will be called on again to win the nation’s wars. This is but one “keyhole wide” view of what and how this might take place. One central premise is that a “shock” should be applied to “the system”, primarily to break decades old habits and mindsets, but also to take full advantage of the emerging information age in the Army’s organizations and equipment. Conventional wisdom holds that large bureaucratic organizations fear and resist change, particularly change that may, in the short term, cause significant destabilization. This is particularly true for a tradition bound institution like the Army. However I am hopeful that, with continued debate throughout the force, the collective will to make significant - perhaps occasionally terrifying - change can be mustered.

**Appendix A (Case Studies in 20th Century American Defense Reorganization) to
OPORD 1-97.**

Elihu Root and The Spanish-American War:

For its first century the United States was not nearly as much a world power as it was a continental power, with dominion over its own North America. Reflecting the dual nature of warfare regarded by contemporary thinkers of the time, two distinct executive departments for the conduct of military operations were established late in the 18th century, the War Department and Department of the Navy, with secretariats and bureaucracies that would defend powerful institutional interests well into the 20th Century. Their creation, almost by edict if one takes Article II, Section 8 of the Constitution literally ("...; and to make Rules for the Government and regulation of the land and naval forces."), and conduct through the 19th century reflected the very separate nature in which warfare was then considered; land and sea. Throughout the 1800s the Navy deigned itself to protect America from foreign, namely European, predators while the Army saw its mantra as helping a young nation conquer a continent.

The American experience in the Spanish-American War changed all this. Although a strategic victory, it was an ugly one because American forces in the field were victorious in spite of the organization supporting them. Staff planning in Washington proved inept as mountains of supplies sent to support forces in Cuba wilted in the Tampa sunshine. Reason: those coordinating support in the War Department simply did not know that rail and shipping facilities in south Florida were woefully inadequate.⁴⁵

Accustomed to over 30 years of domestic peace and relatively small campaigns against Indians in the West, the American military, and particularly the Army, had failed to fully appreciate the ramifications of industrial age warfare that required mountains of supplies and detailed staff planning.

The Spanish American War also heralded the emergence of the United States onto the stage as a major world power in its own right. Beginning around 1890, in the span of less than 15 years, America went from a nation focused internally, finally conquering its frontier and healing from a bitter Civil War, to one with global responsibilities equal to the great nations of Europe and Asia. Britain, Japan, Germany and France were suddenly forced to make room on the multi-polar world stage for the North American newcomer and adjust power among them all accordingly. Victory in the Spanish-American War also introduced a heretofore unheard of element into military operations; colonial administration of overseas territories. There was no precedent in American history where the military - and particularly the Army - was to be the agent for introducing the rule of law to conquered populations. Taken together, America's new role as a world power and the organizational problems in governing overseas territories became the impetus for the first defense reorganization in American history.

The man responsible for initiating American defense reorganization at that time was an unlikely hero. Elihu Root, a corporate lawyer by trade, was originally asked by President McKinley to be Secretary of War and concentrate his efforts on administration of Cuba and the Philippines - not run the Army. However, with deliberate, dispassioned analysis he soon understood that the reason America's Army was inefficient in the War

and uncomfortable in governing colonies sprang from its culture and organization that had not adapted to the realities of modern, industrial age warfare of the time.⁴⁶ In his first annual report of 1899, Root pushed for contingency planning by a centralized staff in Washington, adequate material provisioning (war stockpiling), merit promotions instead of cronyism, and regular field maneuvers. In later legislation he asked for formal organization of a General Staff in the War Department to forestall a repeat of the debacle in support of the troops in Cuba. Over the bureaucratic objections of the Army's Commanding General at the time, General Nelson A. Miles, he asked Congress to change the name of the Army's ranking position from Commanding General to Chief of Staff. Founding a War College for study political-military policy at the strategic level of war is perhaps his most famous and enduring legacy. Finally, his creation of the Joint Army and Navy Board to review military procurement reflected not only a desire to limit duplication between the services, but was also the first truly joint effort between two secretariats that had grown far apart: the War and Navy Departments. Although "only" Secretary of War, and thus the Army, Root still realized that future wars were going to be joint and that the Army would probably not be, "the whole machine with which any war will be fought".⁴⁷

The inability to plan, coordinate, and support credible military operations overseas was lacking and certainly not worthy of a nation desiring to be a major power. The number and scope of Root's changes were unprecedented for a civilian Secretary of War, particularly in that they wrested forever initiative away from a moribund Army staff that had become encrusted with traditional methods of operation.⁴⁸ Whereas many

previous Secretaries of War in the late 1800s might have been described as feckless, Root recast the standard by which all his successors would be judged by the force of his vision.

To summarize, America's first major defense reorganization occurred at the turn of the century after the Spanish-American War. Its twin causes were inept execution during the war and the nation's emergence onto the world stage with responsibilities requiring it to convincingly project power overseas. The military mindsets of Gettysburg and Wounded Knee had to be retired if America was to become a credible world power in the post-industrial age. Fifteen years later, World War I would validate the wisdom of many of these organizational changes, but also point the need for even more evolution as mechanization's power fully emerged on the battlefield.

World War II and its Aftermath:

Separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all Services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparation and organizational activity must conform to this fact.⁴⁹

(Eisenhower's message to Congress, April 3, 1958)

Unity of control over American armed services became generally accepted if not during, then certainly after World War II. Under pressure to effectively plan the war effort, an ad hoc organization called the Joint Chiefs of Staff under General George Marshall was created in 1942 to better facilitate allied (U.S.- British) as well as joint (air, land and sea) strategic prosecution of the war. At the operational level, unification of command and control under one person was attempted late in the war by naming

Eisenhower the Supreme Commander in Europe, but remained elusive in the Pacific primarily due to service and personality conflicts between MacArthur and Nimitz.

The stunning American success in 1945 should have made unifying the services under central civilian and uniformed direction after the war easy to embrace. However, despite all the major commanders; Eisenhower, Nimitz, MacArthur and Halsey, having publicly favored a single department system for defense, all the services - but particularly the Navy - fought battles through the various review commissions and in the halls of Congress to have their preference heard in post war reorganization plans.⁵⁰

Service resistance to other changes in military reorganization and in how the military was to be controlled by civilian and uniformed leadership was also responsible for many of the flaws written into the National Security Act of 1947 that had to be corrected in legislation over the next 11 years. When originally signed into law, the National Security Act established a Joint Chiefs of Staff (without a Chairman), a Secretary of Defense (over an organization originally called the National Military Establishment with no authority over the four services), and the National Security Council. As passed in that original legislation, the National Security Council's members included not only the Secretary of Defense and State, but the three service Secretaries as well! Only after 1958 do all the outlines of today's familiar military structure become recognizable with further subordination of the military departments to Defense, clarification of the chain of command from the President through the Secretary to the Commanders in Chief and strengthening of the Secretary of Defense's office in some, but not all, budgetary matters.⁵¹

The failure to originally establish the position of JCS Chairman, and thus opt for consensus military advice from the service chiefs to the National Command Authorities, reflected Congressional concern about placing a single uniformed in charge of all the nation's armed forces. Interestingly this fear, dating back to the founding days of America, was to reemerge during final negotiations over Goldwater - Nichols legislation some 40 years later.⁵² But while the lines of authority and control in 1958 were much clearer, certainly than they were in 1947, continued bureaucratic inertia and service resistance to further change was going to be part of the impetus for the next round of reform.

Goldwater-Nichols and Perfecting the Cold War Construct:

Three events in the early 1980s were to lead to the most major defense reorganization effort since 1947. The botched Iranian hostage rescue attempt in 1980 along with the 1983 Beirut bombing of the Marine barracks and invasion of Grenada only a few days later provoked a storm of public and Congressional concern. Investigators from both the press and Congress concluded that glaring deficiencies existed in how joint forces worked together (as in the Iranian rescue attempt and in Granada) and the types of intelligence support they received.⁵³

The reason for this military inefficiency, according to Archie Barrett in his book, Reappraising Defense Organization, was that service bureaucracies still dominated decision making within DoD and the JCS. Citing up to six major Defense organizational studies dating from 1970 to 1980, Barrett (and others) contested that, despite the

legislation reforms following World War II, “[t]he preeminence of the four services in the DOD organizational structure is completely out of proportion to their legally assigned and limited formal responsibilities for the *maintaining* function - in essence, organizing, training and equipping forces.”⁵⁴ (original emphasis) Additional criticisms were that the Joint Chiefs of Staff too often gave watered down advice, combatant commanders faced a confusing chain of command and that the roles of service secretaries vis a vis the Secretary of Defense was vaguely defined in law. Thus, when then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General David Jones, testified before Congress that flaws in his organization inhibited useful advice ever reaching political decision makers, the stage was set for the most sweeping defense reorganization since 1947.⁵⁵

Called by many the most far reaching defense legislation since 1947, “Goldwater - Nichols” as it is known today, made several significant changes in the Department of Defense and particularly for those serving in it. In particular, the Secretary’s position was strengthened as was that of the Chairman who became the President’s principal military advisor. The combatant CINC’s chain of command and responsibilities were clarified and increased to reflect the mission assigned their commands. Finally, and what many on active duty consider to be the biggest change, it mandated a set of officer management policies that emphasized joint assignments over those in the various services. In short, at the same time Goldwater - Nichols cleared up lines of authority and reset spheres of power between bureaucracies in the Pentagon, it also reset incentive structures for thousands of officers throughout all four services toward “jointness”.⁵⁶

Summary:

Twice this century the United States has reorganized its Army, and defense establishment, after emerging victorious from war and as the power among great nations in the world correspondingly shifted. America has again emerged victorious from war, the 40 year Cold War, but has yet to seriously undertake Army, along with the rest of its defense establishment, reorganization efforts. The fact that a third shift in international power this century also takes place at the dawn of the information age only makes this issue more compelling.

But while periods of international change following victory in war are perhaps the best opportunities for reorganizing defense, American military and civilian leaders need to also recognize a distinct century old trend as they look to the future. Despite bureaucratic lethargy, that trend is unmistakably toward a centralization of control over, and effort among, the armed forces. Its meaning for the Army is that jointness with all other services, at all levels of command, will increasingly become the way things are, and should be, done in the future.

ENDNOTES

1. Bradley Graham, "Military Forces are Near 'Breaking Point,' GOP Charges", *The Washington Post*, April 9, 1997, p.1/14.
2. Morton H. and David Halperin, "The Key West Key", *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 53, Winter 1983-84, pp. 114-116. The Halperin father and son team claim in this somewhat dated, but nonetheless interesting, article that the roles and mission defined for the services at Key West are responsible for military inadequacies ranging from an overreliance on helicopters in Vietnam, to 1980s mistakes in MX missile basing.
3. Earl H. Tilford, Jr., ed., *World View: The 1997 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997, p. 2. Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer also indicated in a briefing to the Senior Service College Fellows on August 1, 1996 that the next near peer threat was anticipated around the year 2010.
4. President William J. Clinton, State of the Union Address, January 27, 1997.
5. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "What New World Order?", *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1992, pp. 83-96. In this article Nye describes the future world order as evolving into one of "multilevel interdependence".
6. Zbignew Brzezinski, Lee Hamilton, Richard Lugar, *Foreign Policy into the 21st Century: The U.S. Leadership Challenge*, Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, September, 1996, pp. xi-xvi. It is interesting to note the areas of vital interest mentioned in major a foreign policy speech by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger on March 27, 1997. (<http://www.csis.org/html/berger.html>) He mentioned Europe and "the Asia-Pacific community" by name as two of America's six "key strategic objectives", the only regions mentioned specifically. One immediately notes the continents of Africa and South America missing from this list. While the former might be as unfortunate as it is understandable, it is hard to imagine the United States abandoning a history of hemispheric prerogative first voiced by President James Monroe in the early 1800s. Europe, and the Pacific rim are also the major strategic areas envisioned by the Army After Next Project as where American vital interests will lie in the year 2025. COL Robert B. Killebrew, "The Army After Next", *Armed Forces Journal International*, October 1996, p. 44.
7. *1997 Strategic Assessment*, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1997, pp. 18-19.
8. *1997 Strategic Assessment*, p. 50.

9. 1997 *Strategic Assessment*, p. 85. Anthony Cordesman, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies states that the latest unclassified DIA estimates place Iranian arms imports at only \$400-500 million a year as compared to \$2.2 Billion during the Gulf War and a peak of \$3.7 Billion during the Iran-Iraq War. "The Quadrennial Defense Review and the American Threat to the United States", unpublished manuscript, January 14, 1997.
10. Bill Gertz, "Iran Buys Arms From Russia", *The Washington Times*, April 16, 1997, p. 1. Although the threat posed by anti-aircraft missiles migrating to Iran is very real, particularly when it might involve terrorist use, the likely use of large ground forces to remedy the situation is surely not the first option solution.
11. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996. A short article taken from chapter 8 of the book can be found in Huntington, "The Challenger Civilizations", *Harvard Magazine*, pp. 54-56. The lively debate between Huntington and his naysayers is in the Winter and Spring, 1997 issues of *The National Interest*.
12. Billy T. Brooks and Kevin Roller, "Historical Analysis of U.S. Military Responses: 1975-1995", prepared for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Science Applications International Corporation, McLean, VA, October 1, 1996, pp. iv-vii.
13. The metric used in this study for ground forces defined any level of effort above a battalion size as being a major level of effort. By comparison the Navy described its major level of effort as 2 carrier battle groups and the Air Force, one or more combat wings.
14. Lawrence J. Korb, "More than Ready for Two Desert Storms", *The Washington Post*, January 29, 1997, p. 21.
15. *The Military Balance*, 1996/97. Oxford: The Oxford University Press, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996, p. 41.
16. *The Military Balance*, p. 112. At the first open session of presentations to the National Defense panel on April 16, 1997, Mr. John Steinbruner of Brookings called the Russian military, "radically underfinanced" and cautioned that its control of that nation's nuclear weapons was the major concern for the near to intermediate future - a topic left largely out of discussion in this paper.
17. Rick Maze, "Officials claim no immediate threat to national security", *Army Times*, February 17, 1997, p. 10. Mr. Maze was quoting from LTG Patrick M. Hughes', director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 6, 1997.

18. U.S. Congress, House, Washington, DC: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal year 1997: Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 3230, Subtitle B - Force Structure, 104th Congress, 2d Session. Section 922. Findings, (3).
19. Although the gap in defense spending has received considerable attention in the last few months, one of the best earlier summaries of this mismatch was, Don M. Snider, Daniel Goure, Steve Cambone, "Defense in the Late 1990s: Avoiding the Train Wreck". Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995. Richard Perle of the American Enterprise Institute testified before the National Defense Panel on April 16, 1997 that the gap was between \$100 and \$150 billion in the future years defense program. Bryan Bender, *Defense Daily*, April 17, 1997, p. 106. Harlan K. Ullman, in a book written two years ago, contends that the defense spending shortfall could be as high as \$300 billion by the turn of the century. *In Irons, U.S. Military Might in the New Century*, London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., Ltd., 1995, p. 7.
20. *Army Budget; Fiscal Year 1997*, Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, May, 1996, p. 3.
21. This data comes from any number of sources but the drop in spending vis a vis GDP and total federal outlays is best seen in *Defense 96 Almanac*, Washington, DC: United States Department of Defense, 1996, p. 11 and in *1997 Strategic Assessment*, p. 4. Although 3% may seem small, just within NATO it still far eclipses all our allies, except for Turkey. *1997 Strategic Assessment*, p. 43.
22. A good review of the entire weapons obsolescence and replacement conundrum is found in Snider, et. al., pp. 8-9. The numbers for this chart was taken from a presentation prepared by Dr. Jeffrey Raney, Systems Planning Corporation for the Center for Strategic and International Studies with data from the Department of Defense, FY 1997 Budget Briefing, March 4, 1996.
23. Greg Schneider, "New Fighters to cost more, Congress told", *The Baltimore Sun*, February 14, 1997, p. 1.
24. Ullman, *In Irons*, p. 78.
25. Data supplied by Dr. Jeff Raney, Systems Planning Corporation.
26. Jeff Erlich and Robert Holzer, "QDR Turns to Troop Cuts to Afford Weapons", *Defense News*, February 17-23, 1997, p. 3. The authors points out that in the runup to the QDR, defense officials had been counting on infrastructure streamlining to generate about \$20 billion a year in savings that could be redirected toward weapons procurement. In the final analysis, they could only count on less than half, \$9 billion.
27. *Army Budget; Fiscal Year 1997*, p. 4.

28. Data prepared for the Center for Strategic and International Studies by System Planning Corporation. In these forecasts inflation averages 4% annually and real annual GDP growth falls from 2.2% to 1.4% over the FY 1997-2030 period.

29. *Army Budget; Fiscal Year 1997*, p. 5.

30. Bradley Graham, "Pentagon's Plan for Future Draws Heavily from Cold War Past", *The Washington Post*, May 11, 1997, p. A19 gives an excellent overview of the defense debate now raging in Washington. The rising costs of the F-22, F/A-18E/F and JSF are outlined in Jeffrey Record, "Three planes, one wallet", *The Baltimore Sun*, February 25, 1997, p. 13. The Crusader is an Army artillery system now estimated to weigh as much as 70 tons and cost in the neighborhood of \$3 billion for the entire program.

31. The purpose of an Army quote is a personal favorite and was used widely by Former Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan. Winning "big" is really a continuation of "the Weinberger Doctrine" and most recently espoused by Secretary of Defense William Cohen at a speech at the University of Georgia April 28, 1997. "We don't want to engage in a fair fight, in a contemporary war of attrition".

32. Naming units for redesignation or elimination is an emotional topic and will be avoided so as not to detract from the rest of the paper. However, with a greatly diminished chance for large scale land combat for the next few years, it is hard to justify keeping more heavy divisions than is needed, especially with a fully transitioned Force XXI division and Armored Cavalry Regiment. Melding airborne and airmobile capabilities under one, perhaps four brigade, division should also be seriously examined.

33. *Army Budget; Fiscal Year 1997*, p. vii.

34. Ibid. Many senior officers say that the average soldier can now expect to be away from his or her unit about 130 days a year. No question this is a significant strain on the soldier, unit and family support structure. But to use this as the sole reason to deny force structure cut recommendations without searching for ways to "spread the pain", keeps us from looking for other creative solutions.

35. Kristin Patterson, "Leaders agree Reserves ready for more responsibility", *Army Times*, March 31, 1997, p. 26.

36. LTG Jay Garner, Assistant Vice Chief of Staff echoed a renewed willingness to shift peacekeeping and other missions to the reserve components at the Center for Strategic and International Studies April 15, 1997 and at a symposium for the Association of the United States Army April 18, 1997.

37. Douglas A. Macgregor, *Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century*, Westport, CT: Preager, 1997.

38. "Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force on Tactics and Technology for 21st Century Military Superiority", Vol. 2, Part 1, Supporting Materials, Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, October, 1996, p. S-2. The Board also laments, "What is missing are the organizations and processes necessary to test and evolve joint warfighting architectures for new concepts such as the distributed, expeditionary force concept proposed here:...", p. S-3.
39. The comparison between Chapter 8, FM 100-5, (1 July 76) and Chapter 7 of FM 100-5, (20 August 82) is stark. Remembering how the concepts of "active defense" and AirLand Battle were applied on terrain walks along the inter-German border as a junior officer brings the differences into even sharper focus.
40. See Frederick Kagan, "Army Doctrine and Modern War: Notes Toward a New Edition of FM 100-5", *Parameters*, Spring 1997, pp. 134-151 for a critique of the current FM 100-5 and its failure to fully address the emerging information age.
41. Harlan Ullman, et. al., *Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance*, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996.
42. Government Accounting Office, "Army National Guard: Planned Conversions Are a Positive Step, but Unvalidated Combat Forces Remain", Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 29, 1997.
43. Ullman, *In Irons*, pp. 156-157. Depressingly, the ratios widened in favor of "tail" at a faster rate after 1991.
44. "Defense Science Board 1996 Summer Study on Achieving an Innovative Support Structure for 21st Century Military Superiority", Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, November, 1996, pp. ES-1-4.
45. C. Jessup, *Elihu Root*, New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1938, p. 220.
46. Jessup, p. 221.
47. Jessup, p. 223. Extensive additional information about Root's reorganization of the Army can be found on pp. 253-264.
48. Jessup, p. 251-253. There is a particularly interesting account of an early Elihu Root disagreement with General Miles over promotions. Root saw a need to expand part of the Army for duty in the Phillipines and asked Miles for recommendations on which officers should be selected to command the units. Miles responded that the custom in expanding the Army was to promote, based upon seniority, those to serve in the newer units, and so on down the ranks. Root rejected the list and required merit promotions be established instead. Thus began today's universally accepted military promotion system.

49. Alice C. Cole, et. al., ed., *The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization 1944-1978*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979, p. 149.
50. Walter Millis, *Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy*, New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958, pp. 146-147.
51. Ronald H. Cole, et. al., *The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-1993*, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, The Joint History Office, 1995, p. 11.
52. Interview with Archie Barrett, December 17, 1996. During final stages of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, negotiations were held between the House and Senate on the issue of what increased role and responsibilities the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was to have. Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) adamantly opposed having any one military person in charge of all armed forces. For that reason, in part, the Chairman was specifically left out of the operational chain of command that runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the combatant CINCs.
53. A short but thorough review of events leading up to Goldwater-Nichols can be found in Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., "Unification of the United States Armed Forces: Implementing the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act", Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, August 6, 1996, pp. 3-5.
54. Archie D. Barrett, *Reappraising Defense Organization*, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1983, p. 79. The six studies are compared on pp. 82-85.
55. Lovelace, pp. 5-9.
56. James R. Locher III, "Taking Stock of Goldwater - Nichols", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn 1996, pp. 10-13. Also in the same edition see David C. Jones, "Past Organizational Problems", pp. 23-28.